Polaris 1.0 Reference demo
One always-on deployment, polaris-1-0-reference, that shows prevention,
detection and recovery of a kernel attack. Plain Polaris, no Invary.
Unlike the three older demos there is no broker. Everyone who runs this is a
member of the demo's GCP project (echo-487317), so the CLI uses their own
gcloud login instead. Setup per machine is one command:
gcloud auth login # a member of echo-487317
The CLI lives in the polaris-deploy checkout at scripts/polaris-1-0.sh. It
reads the endpoint and tokens from Secret Manager with your own login, so you
do not need to have deployed anything.
Pinned version
Run the demo from the tag polaris-1-0-demo-v2, not from main, so work on
main cannot change the demo under you. Keep a checkout of its own at the tag
and install the CLI from it:
git -C polaris-deploy fetch --tags
git -C polaris-deploy worktree add ../polaris-deploy-demo polaris-1-0-demo-v2
polaris-deploy-demo/scripts/polaris-1-0.sh install
Polaris Desktop carries the same tag; the demo's TestFlight build is cut from
it. To move the demo forward, check that scripts/tests/polaris-1-0-demo-holds.sh
passes on main (CI runs it), then tag a new version and point the checkout at
it with git -C polaris-deploy-demo checkout <new tag>.
Commands
| Command | What it does |
|---|---|
./scripts/polaris-1-0.sh watch | Streams each attestation as it arrives, appended below the last, so you can scroll back to any earlier one. Ctrl-C stops it. Needs only the read-only token, which the CLI fetches for you. |
./scripts/polaris-1-0.sh status | The board once: per-layer verdicts and learning. |
./scripts/polaris-1-0.sh desktop | Print the endpoint and token to paste into Polaris Desktop. |
./scripts/polaris-1-0.sh prevent | Act 1: load a module signed by an untrusted key and watch the kernel refuse it. The verdict stays pass. |
./scripts/polaris-1-0.sh attack | Act 2: load the trusted-signed rogue module and leave it loaded. The attacker then opens an outbound connection to exfiltrate. L3.1 fails on the module and L3 alerts on the connection in the same cycle, the key is revoked, the workload is cut off. |
./scripts/polaris-1-0.sh restore | Act 3: unload the module and watch the verdict return to pass. It also clears the ransomware act. |
./scripts/polaris-1-0.sh ransom | Act 4: an attacker who logged in with a stolen SSH key drops ransomware. It locks the files on a decoy share and calls home. IMA runtime finds a program it never measured, and the eBPF profile finds a binary the host does not run and a connection to an unrecognized address. It clears itself after 5 minutes, or run restore. |
Running the demo
Two windows, or one: watch appends each attestation and the acts print in
the same form, so it works in its own window or in the main one between acts
(Ctrl-C to stop it). In the first window, the live stream, with Polaris
Desktop open beside it:
./scripts/polaris-1-0.sh watch
For Desktop, run ./scripts/polaris-1-0.sh desktop and paste the endpoint and
token into the Security screen (Add Endpoint).
In the second window, the three acts, in order:
./scripts/polaris-1-0.sh prevent
./scripts/polaris-1-0.sh attack
./scripts/polaris-1-0.sh restore
./scripts/polaris-1-0.sh ransom
./scripts/polaris-1-0.sh restore
Act 1 shows that a normal attacker cannot even load the module: the kernel
runs with Secure Boot and lockdown=integrity, so it refuses a module no
trusted key signed, root or not. Act 2 stands in for an insider with a stolen
signing key: the module loads, and Polaris catches the load itself. L3.1 fails
with unauthorized kernel module loaded: roguebpf. With the eBPF monitor
blinded, the attacker opens an outbound connection to exfiltrate, and L3 network
alerts on it in the same cycle (connected to unrecognized destination 192.0.2.1:443, a reserved test address so nothing leaves the sandbox). The
workload key is revoked, the proxy closes its gate, the secret lease is dropped
and the SPIFFE socket stops issuing. Act 3 unloads the module, stops the
connection and everything returns. Pass --no-exfil to run the module-only
version.
Act 4 is the attack most people have met: ransomware. Someone logs in with a
stolen SSH key and starts it. It encrypts the files on a made-up finance share,
leaves a ransom note, and tries to reach 198.51.100.66:443, another reserved
test address that the deployment's egress firewall blocks anyway. Polaris does
not stop the encryption; it catches the program within one attestation, the
binary the host profile never runs and its connection attempt, both naming
/var/tmp/.sysupdate/encryptor, and revokes the key so the workload's secrets
are cut off. restore stops it and removes the files.
Notes
- The attack acts need IAP SSH and sudo on the CVM, which a project owner has. Watching needs only the token.
- The deployment runs with L3.1 and
l3_binariesenforcing, so Act 2 and the ransomware act revoke the key rather than only alerting. A redeploy resets the dials; set them again withscripts/deploy.sh promote --project echo-487317 --name polaris-1-0-reference --layers l31,l3_binaries. - The rogue module and both signed copies are baked into the CVM image and only ever run on this throwaway sandbox.